By Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)
This publication proposes an unique thought of epistemic justification that gives a brand new option to relate justification to the epistemic target of truth-conducive trust. the speculation is predicated on a singular research of trustworthy belief-formation that solutions vintage objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The research generates a manner of distinguishing justified trust from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation needn't be justificatory while systemic deception might be. It thereby respects the instinct that criteria for justification has to be obtainable to the believer, whereas holding the fundamental connection of justification to truth.
The research indicates how justification pertains to, yet is particular from, facts, rationality, and likelihood. It offers a unifying therapy of matters principal to present debate in epistemology, together with epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, advantage theories, the impression of success on wisdom and justification, the translation of subjunctive stipulations for justification, the clash among internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical assessment of epistemological theories. There are additional purposes to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of technology, and ethics.
The booklet will have interaction philosophers operating in epistemology or comparable fields, and their graduate students.
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Extra info for A Theory of Epistemic Justification
But this threatens to reintroduce a frequency interpretation of reliability. Reliable methods usually give the right results because they are usually used under conditions that are (by definition) normal in which they do not (by definition) err. Perhaps what happens under unusual conditions is not that we get a false belief but that we get no belief. The thermometer does not read incorrectly; it breaks and the mercury leaks out. Then false belief is not inevitable under a frequency interpretation of normalcy.
There are also cases in which it is clear that one does know, but one’s justification is questionable. A child knows where his mother hid the cookies; he can show you. But is it plausible to ascribe to the child a justified belief as to the location of the cookies on any basis other than the presupposition that knowledge requires justified belief? What of the dog who knows where he buried the bone? The paradigm indicator of knowledge is what one can demonstrate, in the sense of showing or doing.
He argues that people can have justified beliefs that do not advance any epistemic goal of their own, but he does not like the idea of a general epistemic goal attributable to no one. His point against a general goal, though, is only that it does not redeem instrumental rationality. I can grant him that. Instrumental rationality extends only to methods, not to the beliefs they produce. 2 Kelly (2003) says that with respect to matters in which one takes no interest, one has no cognitive goal better served by true than by false beliefs.